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Abstract
Thorstein Veblen, a founder of original or old institutional economics, combined social and evolutionary thought in his institu-
tionalist approach to dealing with psychological, social, and economic issues. The psychological content of Veblen’s writings takes
instinct and habits into consideration. The economic literature on the psychological content of Veblen’s writings has focused on
habits, despite the importance of instincts in Veblen’s works. This paper attempts to discuss Veblen’s notion of instincts in order
to make its role clearer in his approach to conspicuous consumer decision making. It discusses the role of instincts, the instinct of
workmanship, the relationship between habits and instincts, and their influence on the conspicuous consumer. Consequently, this
paper contributes to a better understanding of how inner forces and socialization culminate in behavior in Veblen’s conspicuous
consumer approach.
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reserved.
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Resumo
Thorstein Veblen foi um dos fundadores da Economia Institucional Original ou Velha Economia Institucional. Em seus escritos,
Veblen associou as lógicas social e evolucionária em sua abordagem institucional – contemplando elementos da Psicologia, da
Sociologia e da Economia. O conteúdo psicológico dos escritos de Veblen considera instintos e hábitos. A literatura econômica
sobre o tema tem seu foco na análise dos hábitos, apesar da importância dos instintos na obra de Veblen. Este artigo discute a noc¸ão
de instintos para Veblen em busca de esclarecer o papel dos instintos na tomada de decisão do consumidor conspícuo vebleniano, o
papel dos instintos, o instinto do trabalho eficiente, a relac¸ão entre hábitos e instintos e sua influência sobre o consumidor conspícuo.∗ Tel.: +55 41 8849 0012.
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onsequentemente, este texto contribui para uma melhor compreensão de como impulsos internos e o processo de socializac¸ão
ulminam no comportamento do consumidor conspícuo de Veblen.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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.  Introduction
Thorstein Veblen’s The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class  (1899) deals with the psychological, social, and economic issues
f how institutions influence people’s behavior from an evolutionary perspective. For Veblen, neither individuals nor
nstitutions are taken for granted; he analyzes each from the beginning of their existence. The focus of The  Theory  of
he Leisure  Class  and a large number of Veblen’s later writings is the social creation of habits of thought, institutions,
nd their consequences for the behavior of people in society. Veblen’s first book resulted in a proliferation of studies on
nstitution in other areas of economics. This approach was named later as institutional economics (Hamilton, 1919).
owadays, studies in the Veblenian tradition are identified as “old” or “original” institutional economics.
The psychological importance of original institutional economics is that it stresses acknowledgment of the ways
ndividuals learn within a society that contains institutions (Dugger, 1980; Hodgson, 2003). Psychological insights
n Veblen’s theory rely on the American pragmatist school of philosophy (Edgell and Tilman, 1989; Twomey, 1998).
ontemporaneously, this aspect has been analyzed more closely by what is recognized today as cognitive psychology
Hodgson, 1985; Melody, 1987; Redmond, 2006; Stein, 1997). With regard to issues usually analyzed by studies that
ake the psychology of Veblen’s conspicuous consumer into account, habit in decision making plays a central role.
ndeed, habit is a key element in Veblen’s theory. Despite the importance of the place of habits in Veblen’s conspicuous
onsumer approach, there are other important psychological elements in Veblen’s conspicuous consumer psychology,
uch as instincts. The role of instincts in the Veblenian approach to decision making has been studied less. This paper
ntends to contribute toward this direction of study.
Instinct is a common concept in scientific approaches. Biology, anthropology, sociology, psychology, philosophy
nd even economics deal with the notion of instinct. During the eighteenth century, the instinct was a usual issue in
hilosophical writings. During the early nineteenth century, psychology became organized and recognized as the field
f science that started to influence the development of several decision making concepts, such as instincts. Veblen’s
efinition of instinct would be considered unusual if compared to philosophical and psychological concepts, however.
o be unusual contribute to Veblen’s concept of instinct be a minor issue in the literature about institutional economics.
his paper proposes to discuss Veblen’s concept of instinct and its place in his conspicuous consumer’s decision making
n order to address a better comprehension of Veblen’s institutional economics and conspicuous consumer decision
aking.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Veblen’s concept of instinct by stressing its
ifferences from the common-sense approach to what instinct means. In Section 2, a Veblenian instinct is introduced as
n association between an inner impulse to behave with objects of the external world—taking consumers into account,
hese objects are goods. This discussion indicates that habits and institutions show consumers how to associate an
nner impulse with a good. Section 3 details the impact of habits and institutions on the conspicuous consumer’s
nner impulses–goods relationship by stressing the role of the leisure class in conspicuous consumer decision making.
n doing so, it is possible to address the most important Veblenian instinct for the conspicuous consumer’s decision
aking, the instinct of workmanship. Consequently, Section 3 introduces the role of emulation, social selection, and
leasure institutionally built. A few final considerations close the paper in Section 4.
.  Instinct  and  the  impulse–object  relationshipVeblen’s writings have been documented and analyzed extensively. Generally, these studies examine Veblen’s
ritings for their influence on institutional economics and methodological issues (Hodgson, 2004a; Mayhew, 1987;
eukert, 2001; Rutherford, 1984). With regard to institutional economics, Veblen’s perspective takes into account the
volution of thoughts and behavior expressed in institutionalized procedures in a society. Concerning methodology,
228 F. Almeida / EconomiA 16 (2015) 226–234
two topics are emphasized: the unfulfilled development of the Veblenian evolutionary approach (see Mayhew, 1998;
Rutherford, 1998) and the abduction of Darwinism to the social field1 (see Cordes, 2007; Hodgson, 2004b, 2008).
With regard to the conspicuous consumer’s decision-making, Veblen’s perspective is associated usually with the role
of habits and institutions in the evolution of thought and behavior.
Indeed, Veblen’s institutionalism became well known for its evolutionary approach regarding habits, institutions,
and their relationship. They are the central elements in Veblen’s analysis. However, other aspects of Veblen’s approach
to decision making can be explored further, such as his concept of instinct. Understanding the Veblenian approach to
instincts is important because of Veblen’s unique perspective of instincts. In addition, his instinctive approach aids a
better comprehension of his institutional economics and conspicuous consumer’s decision making.
At the starting of the discussion about Veblen’s concept of instinct, it is important to address the distinction between
the Veblenian concept of instinct and what is usually understood as instinct by philosophers, psychologists, and common
sense. For the latter group, instinct is an impulse to behave that comes from within the decision maker; it is a purely
internal force. However, for Veblen, an instinct is not a purely internal force to behave. As Veblen did not develop the
usual concept of instinct and in order to avoid a conceptual mess, this paper uses the term “instinct” to refer to Veblen’s
instinct. The usual conceptualization, namely, the philosophical and psychological one, is denominated here as “inner
impulse.”
For Veblen (1914), the prime manifestation of human behavior is conditioned by amoral inner impulses and by
developing naturally endowed skills.2 The development of a decision-making framework and behavior is assisted by
habits and institutions, but we take inner impulses into account in order to analyze Veblen’s notion of instinct. Inner
impulses are the motivation to behave, which can occur even before the conspicuous consumer learns to deal with the
content of habits and institutions. Consequently, inner impulses are not a motivation to behave that comes from the
external world but something that comes from inside the organism of the decision maker. To stress the counterpoint
between the philosophical and psychological conceptualization and the Veblenian notion of instinct, we can take into
account the notion of inner impulses of Sigmund Freud—a prominent psychologist of Veblen’s time.3
According to Freud (1915a), an inner impulse is an extremely complex concept that can be understood as a mental
stimulus generated inside the organism. An inner impulse is a power of constant impact, which is impossible to escape.
The pressure to behave is common in every inner impulse, and these pressures are the reason for the existence of inner
impulses. What decision makers desire is a response to inner impulses, established through pleasure and pain.4 Freud’s
concepts of inner impulse emphasizes that the consequent pleasure and pain vary in intensity according to a large
1 Nowadays, some researchers discuss and develop contemporary insights on the abduction of biological concepts to economics in attempting to
find an evolutionary approach. Among these, the contributions of Geoffrey Hodgson and Richard Nelson are significant for this analysis (Hodgson,
2002a; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2007; Nelson, 2006; Nelson, 2007).
2 For Veblen the notion of morality comes from sociability; he recovered this concept from its Latin origins, implying the notion of custom. Thus,
in Veblenian analyses, morality in society does not refer to ethics. Hence, actions occurring before sociability, such as the behavior of a baby or a
child, cannot be moral or, at most, indicate a low level of morality, since morality have not yet been fully comprehended.
3 Sigmund Freud is considered the founder of the psychological instinctive theory that was introduced in the early 20th century as part of
psychoanalysis. Freud—as the main representative of psychology of that time—introduced his perspective of instincts during the same time that
Veblen was working on his own theory. Hence, Freud’s concept of instinct could be an interesting guideline to discuss the peculiarities of Veblen’s
concept. In the terminology of this paper, Freud’s notion of instinct means an inner impulse.
4 This logic was affirmed not only by Freud, but also by Veblen (1914). Taking into account this reference to pleasure and pain as result of an
instinctive impulse, it is important to highlight that Veblen rejected the utilitarian pleasure–pain decision making logic (see Argyrous and Sethi,
1996; Veblen, 1898; Veblen, 1909). Usually, the passage below is cited as strong disapproval of the traditional economics-based approach to decision
making:
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire
of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is
an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or
another . . . The later psychology, re-enforced by modern anthropological research, gives a different conception of human nature. According
to this conception, it is the characteristic of man to do something, not simply to suffer pleasures and pains through the impact of suitable
forces. He is not simply a bundle of desires that are to be saturated by being placed in the path of the forces of the environment, but rather a
coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity (Veblen, 1898, 389–390).
Veblen believed that an individualistic pleasure–pain reading of human behavior is not enough. From a Veblenian perspective, the socialization
process adds other layers to decision making. This paper clarifies this point further. However, analyzing Veblen’s concept of instinct is important to
highlight issues that demand attention for the influence of socialization on decision making.
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umbers of interrelated factors, such as situation, learning, and goals. Hence, it is impossible to employ mathematical
unctions, as economists generally prefer.
Following the logic highlighted in this section, the result of an inner impulse is pleasure-seeking behavior. An inner
mpulse motivates such a search, but does not guarantee satisfaction (Freud, 1915b). An inner impulse can stay in a
state of displeasure” over time. This unsatisfied period varies from one inner impulse to another, and only in rare
ases does it correspond to a lifetime. For example, the inner impulse to reproduce the species can be in a “state of
ispleasure” for a long time. The same cannot occur for the instinctive impulse to eat.
The goals of inner impulses are always clear; they primarily comprise food, water, and protection. Inner impulses
nd their goals do not change. What can change is how these goals are achieved. Such modifications are no longer a
atter of impulse, but are about the means to achieve ends.5 For example, while there is an inner impulse to eat, people
o not eat just by being guided by inner impulses, rather they eat according to norms: meals are divided throughout the
ay; each meal can be divided on the basis of necessary nutrient consumption; specific types of food can be avoided
ecause they are considered unhealthy; or some types of food are eaten only on special occasions. An inner impulse
s practiced through interaction with the external world, specifically with objects of the external world, such as the
nner impulse to eat and its corresponding object, namely, food (see Freud, 1915b, 1923). How people deal with the
bjects of the external world varies from one person to another, for example, what and how people eat. However, the
stablished relationship among inner impulses and types of objects that make pleasure possible remain common. For
xample, Brazilians eat different things even though there is a typical Brazilian lunch—rice, beans, and meat.
This inner impulse–object relationship is not predetermined and can change over time or be fixed rigidly. It is
 matter of how people learn to put their inner impulse to practice. Inner impulse–object relationships are social
ince a large number of objects are presented, directly or indirectly, by people other than the person attending to the
nner impulse. For example, children know of only a few objects that can satisfy their inner impulses, while a larger
roportion of objects are introduced directly by other people, making the child’s survival possible. For an adult, the
irect introduction of an object of inner impulse by another person can also occur; however, an indirect introduction is
ore likely because adults have been socialized already. As this paper takes into account only Veblen’s conspicuous
onsumer as the decision maker, an inner impulse–object relationship is actually an inner impulse–good relationship.
In less developed societies, the inner impulse–good relationship is usually a matter of subsistence. In developed
ocieties, the relationship may be associated with quality of life. Independently of the motive, cultural learning exists
bout how to acquire and use goods to satisfy inner impulses. According to Veblen (1899), the sociability that mediates
he acquisition of goods is expressed in institutions and their evolution. From the Veblenian standpoint, evolution
oes not mean improvement, but a cumulative modification. Taking an inner impulse–good relationship, cumulative
odification refers to modification in the good associated with inner impulse, which can mean replacement of the good
r change in the good itself. This modification can be soft or deep depending on the evolution of the society.
This evolution, as stated by Veblen (1899, 1914), is associated strongly with the role of habits and institutions in
ecision making. For Veblen (1909, 1919), a society is a scheme of institutions that are outgrowths of habits.6 Because
abits and institutions assist in how common usage of goods and the thoughts about them take place in a social
nvironment, as stated by Veblen’s theory. From this perspective, institutions can be understood as manifestations of
abits and regularities that generate foreseeable occurrences in inner impulse–good relationships. Thus, meal choices
nd dress codes would be examples of institutions. Such a definition of institution has a boundary: it is not applied
o every decision-making scenario, but to the conspicuous consumer’s decision making. The same is true for what
ollows.
Taking habits into consideration, Hodgson (1998) defines the Veblenian concept of habit as a largely non-deliberative
nd self-actuating propensity to engage in a previously adopted pattern of inner impulse–good relationship. It is
mportant to highlight the difference between habit and repetition, as well as the distinction among these concepts
nd behavior. A habit is a form of self-sustaining and non-reflective inner impulse–good relationship that arises in
epetitive situations, but it is not the repetition itself (Hodgson, 2004c; see also Dewey, 1921). Habits are formed through
5 Veblen’s conspicuous consumer approach is about such means, as this paper highlights by addressing details about the role of Veblenian instincts
n the conspicuous consumer’s decision making.
6 This is because Veblen took an evolutionary perspective of societies and how socially created elements influence personal behavior and decision
aking, laying further emphasis on the notion that institutions come from habits.
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repetition; they are influenced by prior activity and have durable and self-sustaining qualities (Hodgson, 2002b). Neither
does habit mean thought or behavior; rather it is a propensity to think or behave in particular ways in specific situations,
which also culminates in specific inner impulse–good relationships. Since habits may exist even if not manifested, they
could be dormant for long periods. Habits are potential thoughts or behavior that end in the association between inner
impulses and goods, triggered by an appropriate stimulus or context (Hodgson, 2002b, 2004c).
Veblen focused more intensely on habits of thought and their consequences for behavior. Moreover, with regard
to socialization, Veblen proposed that history, that is, what people lived, saw, and taught about the past, is a feature
of modern civilizations. Consequently, contemporary communities have a historically established system of habits
of thought. This can be understood as branches of learning. What goods mean and how to use them are subjects of
individual comprehension through institutions (Veblen, 1899, 1906, 1909). The central issue in Veblen’s theory is
that sociability mediates the establishment of inner impulse–good relationships. For Veblen (1909, 1919), each new
situation is a variation of what has gone before. A change of standards is gradual and almost never entirely substitutes
a previous standard, once accepted. It is a cumulative process of institutional change (Veblen, 1899, 1909). Thus, this
cumulative process assists the building of inner impulse–good relationships.
In Veblen’s theory, inner impulse–good relationships play the role of an instinct. This is the reason Veblen’s instincts
are different to inner impulses. Veblen’s intention to address inner impulse–good relationships as instincts is associated
with the fact that the conspicuous consumer perceives the impulse to behave (of the Veblenian instinct) as an inner
impulse. However, institutions of the external world are part of these Veblenian instincts. In addition, Veblen (1899)
stressed a specific kind of instinct that motivates the conspicuous consumer to behave, namely, instinct of workmanship.
Furthermore, Veblen (1899) highlighted the institution that builds the conspicuous consumer’s instinct of workmanship,
namely, the leisure class. Next, Section 3 introduces the importance of the leisure class to the development of Veblenian
instincts, particularly the instinct of workmanship. Here, it is possible to analyze the place of pleasure and displeasure
in Veblen’s conspicuous consumer approach.
3.  Leisure  class,  instinct  of  workmanship,  and  pleasure  institutionally  developed
Section 2 stressed that, for Veblen, there is a cumulative process that is part of developed societies and is expressed
in habits and related institutions. Hence, society’s historicity is expressed in its institutions. Veblen (1899) stressed
a particular type of institution as extremely important for the establishment of inner impulse–good relationships: the
upper socio-economic class, particularly in material terms, namely, the leisure class. According to Veblen (1899),
the leisure class can be found in its most developed form in modern societies, where distinctions among classes are
observed clearly as a result of employment differences. As highlighted by Veblen (1899), upper classes are by custom
exempt or excluded from industrial occupations, and instead are used exclusively for certain kinds of employment
that are associated with a degree of honor. Status is intrinsic to being considered part of the upper class or even the
leisure class. Tasks, situations, and objects that are components of the leisure class become powerful signs of status.
The institution of the leisure class is an outcome of discriminating between what is worthy and what is not (Veblen,
1899).
For Veblen (1899), the evolution of culture generates the leisure class around the same time as the beginning of
the private ownership of goods. Private ownership of goods is the result of conventional facts perpetuated within the
social structure. The central point is that the leisure class and ownership of goods emerge simultaneously. Both arise
from the desire of successful people to exhibit their prowess. Hence, ownership of goods is not just about property
or personal consumption; it is also a question of convention, about demonstrating the use of these goods. Consistent
with this idea, the property system is installed gradually (Veblen, 1899). For Veblen (1899), wherever there is private
property, people are distinguished by the possession of goods, this being an efficient way to express wealth socially.
Veblen (1899) stressed that in a society where almost all goods are private property, the necessity to earn a livelihood
is a powerful and constant incentive for the poorer class. As soon as private property is obtained, emulation becomes
a key guide to behavior. Consequently, social selection occurs based on the capacity to emulate the leisure class’ way
of life.For Veblen (1899), the leisure class regulates the conventionalities of the socially emulative logic of consumption
and its evolution. By emphasizing socially emulative logic of consumption mediated by the leisure class, Veblen’s
approach to consumption relies strictly on its feature of conspicuousness. Conspicuous consumption can be understood
as wasteful monetary expenditure motivated by social esteem. The conspicuous consumer buys goods for their status,
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hus, paying for particular features of these products.7 By this logic, there exists an understanding of how to seek
tatus that can be expressed in concrete, objective ways to emulate the leisure class’ behavior by buying the leisure
lass’ goods (Veblen, 1899). From a Veblenian perspective, through socialization, institutionalized processes relating
o those goods—which should satisfy inner impulses—teach people how they should deal with their inner impulses to
eet material ends. This process culminates in inner impulse–good relationships following an emulative logic. This
atch culminates in the most important conspicuous consumer’s Veblenian instinct.
Veblen stressed some instincts that are extremely important; in the case of the conspicuous consumer, he highlighted
he instinct of workmanship. Despite Veblen’s frequent use of this concept in his analyses, it was not defined clearly.
ccording to Veblen (1899, 29):
As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a center of unfolding
impulsive activity – “teleological” activity. He is an agent seeking in every act the accomplishment of some
concrete, objective, impersonal end. By force of his being such an agent, he is possessed of a taste for effective
work, and distaste for futile effort. He has a sense of the merit of serviceability. This aptitude or propensity may
be called the instinct of workmanship.
This definition of the instinct of workmanship is based on the subject of analysis of The  Theory  of the  Leisure
lass, the importance of the leisure class for the emergence of schemes of life within a society. Hence, an additional
omplementary definition of the instinct of workmanship, can aid its understanding, as follows:
Chief among those instinctive dispositions that conduce directly to the material well-being of the race, and
therefore to its biological success, is perhaps the instinctive bias here spoken as the sense of workmanship
(Veblen, 1914: 25).8
According to the definitions presented, it is possible to affirm that the instinct of workmanship is related directly to
nner impulse dispositions, wherein the pressure of this instinct is satisfied conspicuously by the material well-being
rovided by goods. According to Cordes (2005), Veblen’s instinct of workmanship is a generic human feature guiding
ife toward the emulative use of goods that give purpose to actions. As stated by Veblen (1898, 1914), the instinct of
orkmanship is one of the most important motivations to action. It represents several inner impulses and instinctive
ptitudes at many levels (Veblen, 1914). It reinforces that the instinct of workmanship, as a Veblenian instinct, cannot
e seen as an instinct per  se.9
Institutional theorists, like Almeida (2014) and Cordes (2005), highlight the conceptualization of the instinct of
orkmanship as differing from an inner property of the self. Cordes (2005) and Almeida (2014) stress that the behavioral
onsequence for the decision making of the instinct of workmanship is almost identical to the behavioral consequence
f an inner impulse. Hence, the instinct of workmanship and other Veblenian instincts can be understood as habits
nd institutions of the external world that become deeply internalized by the conspicuous consumer’s decision making
n order to act as an inner impulse. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that Veblen (1914) emphasized a lower level
f habituation mediating the creation of inner impulse–good relationships, that is, the instinct of workmanship. As a
ower level of habituation, the instinct of workmanship is connected to collective knowledge regarding socially createdeans to attain and use goods (Veblen, 1914).
The instinct of workmanship has a defined purpose: the efficient and emulative use of goods to achieve material
ims satisfactorily (Veblen, 1914). Consequently, it is possible to interpret the instinct of workmanship additionally as
 basic kind of habit that supports every other habitual procedure in the emulative logic. In other words, the instinct
f workmanship can be understood as a meta-habit. The motive for the terminology “instinct of workmanship” is in
7 In addition, Veblen (1899) stressed some main features of conspicuously consumed goods. For Veblen (1899), the most typical form of
onspicuous consumption is the “wearing of liveries,” which is the consumption of objects that are more likely to be observed and noticed by
ociety, such as food, clothing, dwellings, and furniture. “Luxuries” are another kind of product typical to conspicuous consumption. For Veblen
1899), the ceremonial differentiation of luxuries is seen better in costly goods. The cost makes them noble and honorific, which generate pleasure
rom their consumption. “Wearing of liveries” and luxuries are expressions of ceremonial features of goods connected to the reputability of products
y wastefulness. According to Veblen (1899), for goods to be reputable, they must be wasteful. In addition to Veblen, the relationship between
astefulness and social lifestyle is analyzed by Mitchell (1912) and Stanfield and Stanfield (1980) from an institutional economics perspective.
8 Despite Veblen’s reference to the instinct of workmanship as “the sense of workmanship,” the usage of the term “instinct” is more popular.
9 The same is true for other “Veblenian instincts,” such as parental bent and idle curiosity. Details about other “Veblenian instincts” are found in
ordes (2005), Latsis (2009), and Waller (2013).
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what can be understood as a chain of habitual processes. The habit called “instinct of workmanship” is placed deeply
in the conspicuous consumer’s decision making and is central for the emulative acquisition of goods.
In the social selection based on emulative acquisition of goods assisted by the instinct of workmanship, Veblen’s
explanation necessitates an overarching, encompassing, and well-established hierarchical system of goods. This system
relies on the status content of goods. Considering that this is a matter of collective knowledge, the system of goods
must be sufficiently well established to enable comparisons among consumers’ actions. This system of goods following
their status content implies that, in Veblenian theory, pleasure is not a physical result, but an institutional consequence.
In addition, this is true for the inability to achieve pleasure through consumption of goods holding high status, which
would be the feeling of displeasure. When the emulative demonstration of status through goods fails, displeasure occurs
(Veblen, 1899, 1914).
By this logic, pleasure and displeasure are established through emulative reasoning. As previously highlighted,
Veblen’s conspicuous consumption means spending money on goods in order to display wealth to other members of
society. However, such goods are not related directly to the pleasure of inner impulses themselves, since they are acquired
by the drive of social esteem. In other words, Veblenian logic considers that taste goes beyond physiological dimensions
(Pietrykowcki, 2004), and that taste is regarded a social dimension (Trigg, 2001). Shipman (2004) emphasizes the taste
issue from another perspective, stressing that Veblen’s conspicuous consumption is the connection of goods to the
impulse to “waste,” despite “taste.” The impulse to waste can be understood as taste involving social learning through
the institution of the leisure class (Ramstad, 1998).
The waste–taste dichotomy reinforces that, in Veblen’s theory, displeasure can be non-physiological. Indeed, in
a large number of cases, displeasure is a mental phenomenon. As highlighted earlier, an inner impulse is satisfied
by the connection to a good according to institutionalized habits that follow emulative logic. When this connection
is not possible, an institutional displeasure—a Veblenian displeasure—takes place. There is a necessary condition
for the occurrence of institutional displeasure: the inner impulse–good relationship’s resultant end must generate
displeasure instead of pleasure. This process is complex at some level because the satisfaction of an inner impulse
is always physiologically pleasant, for example, when a person is hungry or cold, a meal or a jacket, respectively,
generates pleasure. When an institutional displeasure occurs, both pleasure—as a result of an inner impulse—and an
unpleasant sensation—as a failure in the emulative acquisition of goods—are experienced. Consequently, in a situation
of institutional displeasure, the motivating force of displeasure must be stronger than the pleasure of the satisfaction.
This depends on the status content of the good associated with the inner impulse.
A Veblenian conspicuous consumer does not feel hungry or cold when presented with a meal or a jacket, but may not
feel pleasure either. As pleasure is determined by the institutionalized emulative logic, physical pleasure can be expe-
rienced simultaneously with institutional displeasure. The latter is based on the impossibility to work under the pattern
of institutionalized emulative behavior that consumers are accustomed to. When unable to behave according to habits
previously established and deeply internalized in the instinct of workmanship, status that was learned socially is no
longer able to form part of decision making. This mismatch between what is understood as the good that should be con-
sumed and what is actually acquired is the source of institutional displeasure. It is the absence of the good present in the
socially emulative logic. Without this good, the deep habit known as the instinct of workmanship can be left unsatisfied.
Consequently, it is possible to point out two possible manifestations of the institutional displeasure. The first occurs
when consumers are developing their instinct of workmanship. Such a manifestation of displeasure takes place before
the majority of inner impulse–good relationships are fully established. At this point, emulation is akin to being convinced
of the value of particular inner impulse–good relationships since the conspicuous consumer has not developed his or
her decision-making frameworks yet. Since a larger proportion of decision making is learned through consumers’
interactions with institutions, such processes are absent or in the early phases of decision makers’ lives as consumers.
Young people are more likely to be convinced instead of taught because their instinct of workmanship has not yet been
well established. At this point, the repressive feature of institutions is more evident. This repressive logic organizes
all inner impulses in order to generate their connections to goods in an emulative way. Whether this process occurs
depends on socially established differences and comparisons that give goods defined ways of culminating in pleasure.
This kind of institutional displeasure takes place through lack of knowledge of the workings of institutions, habits, and
the instinct of workmanship, but is not the more usual manifestation of institutional displeasure.
The other manifestation of institutional displeasure involves the performance of institutions and habits. The instinct
of workmanship establishes the logic of the conspicuous consumer’s behavior, which is only a method of behaving
or thinking, not the behavior itself. Behavior demands that the drive contained in the instinct of workmanship and
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abits is put into practice. These activities are expressed socially by habitual behavior and other institutionalized
rocesses. Consequently, this other possibility for displeasure is associated with the ceremonialism of institutions.
onspicuous consumption—expressed as people’s waste on goods influenced by the leisure class—takes place as a
esult of the influence of institutions on ceremonial features of consumption (Veblen, 1899, 1914). The ceremonial
eatures of goods go beyond physical aspects since they are created institutionally.10 Through socialization, consumers
earn about different kinds of goods and the ways they should be related to the instinct of workmanship and to other
abits for them to culminate in the effects of status. However, in addition, conspicuous consumption is related to
he satisfaction of inner impulses. As Veblen (1899) highlighted, goods are both ceremonial and instrumental.11 The
eremonial features of goods can increase with time (see Ackerman, 1997). This implies that the evolution of goods
ithin a society can occur without any change in the satisfaction of inner impulses.
In summary, for the Veblenian conspicuous consumer, satisfaction comes from her or his successful display of
tatus through goods. For Veblen, the acquisition of those goods powerfully guides the behavior of the conspicuous
onsumer, becoming itself the source of the impulse to behave. In addition, Veblen considered that there are internal
ressures that motivate decision making for action. However, this internal force is associated strongly with goods of
he external world and the habits and institutions around them. A consequence of conspicuous consumption is that
hile the inner impulse can be satisfied, the person may not be satisfied. This occurs when emulative behavior results
n displeasure. From this perspective, displeasure comes from the instinct of workmanship and from the use of the
eisure class’ habits and institutions in decision making.
.  Final  comments
This paper revisited Veblen’s conspicuous consumer, taking into consideration his instinctive approach. In doing
o, this paper stressed that Veblen’s concept of instinct is different from the psychological notion of inner impulses.
he former is not a purely internal force. For Veblen, inner impulses associate themselves with objects of the external
orld—with regard to the conspicuous consumer, such objects are goods. This association, not inner impulses, is the
owerful motivation for the consumer’s behavior. Hence, institutions of the external world are responsible for what
eblen called “instincts.” In the Veblenian perspective, instincts can be understood as habits deeply internalized by
ecision makers, such as the instinct of workmanship.
The instinct of workmanship is responsible for the organization and canalization of inner impulses to a material
nd. Hence, the instinct of workmanship has a well-defined goal: materialistic satisfaction through the ownership of
oods. Consequently, satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the conspicuous consumer are the results of the existence of
he leisure class and its emulative logic. Once the conspicuous consumer is able to behave as stated by the institutions
f the leisure class, pleasure is achieved. However, failure in this emulative logic means displeasure. In conclusion,
t is important to address that institutional economics studies post-1950 have focused on a cognitive psychological
aradigm. Veblen’s theory deals with a different psychological paradigm. Neither excludes the other, and both offer
mportant insights for the development and improvement of current institutional economics. However, such an analysis
ould be addressed best in another study.
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